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 
Abstract— In the risk assessment of cascading outages, the 
rationality of simulation and efficiency of computation are both of 
great significance. To overcome the drawback of sampling-based 
methods that huge computation resources are required and the 
shortcoming of initial contingency selection practices that the 
dependencies in sequences of outages are omitted, this paper 
proposes a novel risk assessment approach by searching on 
Markovian Tree. The Markovian tree model is reformulated from 
the quasi-dynamic multi-timescale simulation model proposed 
recently to ensure reasonable modeling and simulation of 
cascading outages. Then a tree search scheme is established to 
avoid duplicated simulations on same cascade paths, significantly 
saving computation time. To accelerate the convergence of risk 
assessment, a risk estimation index is proposed to guide the search 
for states with major contributions to the risk, and the risk 
assessment is realized based on the risk estimation index with a 
forward tree search and backward update algorithm. The 
effectiveness of the proposed method is illustrated on a 4-node 
power system, and its convergence profile as well as efficiency is 
demonstrated on the RTS-96 test system.  
Index Terms— Cascading outages, risk assessment, Markovian 
Tree, tree search, multi-timescale, re-dispatch, convergence 
criteria, time delay, risk estimation index 
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C i i i   Cost at the state after outage sequence 
1 2 rk k k
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D   Length of mid-timescale interval 
i   Outage rate of element i   
Pr MCi   
Probability of element i  outage in 
sampling-based model 
Pr MTi   
Probability of element i  outage in 
Markovian tree model 
Delayt   Re-dispatch delay 
Y   Admittance matrix 
Z   Inverse of admittance matrix 
,uv uvY Z   Element at the position of ( , )u v  in matrix 
E   Set of working elements 
V   Set of buses 
1k kr
i iE   
Set of working elements after outages 
1 rk k
i i   
{ , }u v   Branch with node u  and v  as terminals 
uvF   Power flow on branch { , }u v   
  
Abbreviations 
UVLS Under-voltage load shedding 
PTDF Power transfer distribution factor 
TLR Transmission loading relief 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ISK assessment of cascading outages in power systems is 
an important topic since cascading outages are big threats 
to electricity supply as well as to the society[1-3]. One of the 
most challenging problems of risk assessment is the limitation 
of calculation speed brought by the huge number of possible 
cascade paths and the lack of computation resources. One 
commonly-utilized approach of risk assessment is the 
Monte-Carlo method, which repeatedly creates samples of 
events based on their real probabilities until risk converges. 
However, Monte-Carlo method requires large numbers of 
samples to converge, especially for rare events [4]. Since the 
convergence of sampling-based methods relies on the variance 
of sampling, various variance reduction methods are proposed, 
e.g. importance sampling [5], cross-entropy [6], stratification 
[7], etc. These methods can accelerate computation by several 
times compared to Monte-Carlo method. However, the 
improvements are limited and risk assessment still requires 
huge computation.  
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The selection of serious contingency patterns is another 
approach for risk assessment. Various contingency or state 
combination selection techniques have been proposed [8-10]. 
However, these methods treat outages as independent of each 
other, which neglects the fundamental “cascading” nature of 
cascading outages. Reasonable risk assessment requires 
updating the state as well as probability of element outages 
during simulation, which makes the techniques utilized in 
contingency selection methods ineffective. 
Correctly capturing the dependency within sequences of 
outages is a prerequisite of reasonable and practical risk 
assessment, so the simulation of cascading outages is inevitable 
in risk assessment. An effective way of efficiency enhancement 
is to reduce the invocation of simulation. In sampling-based 
methods, lots of time is wasted in duplicated sampling of same 
cascade paths. Actually upon knowing the conditional 
probabilities on each level of cascading outages (which is 
feasible in most existing cascading outage models), the 
efficiency of risk assessment can be significantly improved by 
simulating the cascading outage path and directly estimating 
risk indices using the probability, which avoids duplicated 
simulation of same paths. All possible cascading outage paths 
can be formulated as a tree structure. As cascading outages can 
be regarded as Markovian processes [11, 12], risk assessment 
can be realized as searching on a Markovian tree [13].  
Ref. [11] proposes a Markovian tree model of cascading 
line outages. The model considers the effect of random load 
fluctuation and incorporates time into simulation, which 
enhances practicality. However, the distinct mechanisms of line 
outage directly caused by triggering protection and by slow 
outage process [14] caused by tree contact are not distinguished. 
And processes as slow change of load level and generation 
re-dispatch are not considered.  
Risk assessment should be based on reasonable modeling 
and simulation. Various models have been proposed, including 
topology-based models [15], high-level statistical models 
[16-18], power-flow based models [19-21], models treating 
cascading outages in different stages [22], and models mainly 
considering severe initial outage combinations [23], etc. To 
reflect the essence of cascading outages as a multi-timescale 
complex process which is essential for reasonable simulation 
and risk assessment, our previous work [24] proposes a 
multi-timescale quasi-dynamic simulation model. In the model, 
the events in cascading outages are categorized into three 
timescales, and the interactions among timescales as well as the 
representation of time elapse are realized within the 
quasi-dynamic framework, which enhances the practicality. 
Based on the model in [24], this paper proposes a risk 
assessment method of multi-timescale cascading outages based 
on Markovian tree search. The multi-timescale modeling and 
quasi-dynamic simulation of cascading outage paths are 
reformulated as a Markovian tree, and then the risk assessment 
is realized by searching on Markovian tree. Since duplicated 
simulation of same paths is avoided, the efficiency is expected 
to be significantly enhanced. According to the analysis of the 
causes of the risk, a searching strategy based on a risk 
estimation index is proposed to speed up convergence of risk, 
which further accelerates risk assessment. 
The major contributions of this paper are listed as follows: 
 A multi-timescale cascading outage simulation model 
based on a structure of Markovian tree is established. This 
model is equivalently transformed from our previous work [24] 
of a multi-timescale simulation model with representation of 
time, which is more reasonable than existing models with tree 
structure. Also the detailed realization of the proposed model 
has non-trivial difference from [24], such as the tree structure 
and the definition of outage probability. The proposed model 
maintains the merits of model [24], and bridges the reasonable 
modeling with efficient risk assessment based on tree search. 
 Based on the Markovian tree modeling and simulation 
of cascading outages, a non-duplicated risk assessment 
methodology using Markovian tree search is proposed. The 
novel risk assessment method avoids duplicated simulation of 
cascading paths, significantly saving computation resources. 
The convergence criteria of risk assessment are also proposed. 
 A novel forward-backward Markovian tree search 
scheme based on a risk estimation index is proposed, further 
accelerating the convergence of risk assessment. The risk 
estimation index is established by analyzing the causes of 
cascading outage risk and estimating the costs through 
theoretical derivation, which effectively facilitates the selection 
of high-risk cascading outage paths, significantly accelerating 
the convergence of risk assessment. Moreover, the risk 
estimation index is updated reversely considering the influence 
of simulated states, forming an efficient forward-backward 
Markovian tree search algorithm. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
reformulates the quasi-dynamic multi-timescale simulation as a 
Markovian Tree. Section III proposes the idea of risk 
assessment with Markovian Tree search. Section IV proposes a 
risk estimation index for guiding of the search. And then a 
forward-search-backward-update scheme of risk assessment 
based on the risk estimation index is established. Section V 
presents test case studies of the risk assessment method on a 
4-node system and RTS-96 test system. Section VI draws the 
conclusion. 
II. CASCADING OUTAGE SIMULATION WITH MARKOVIAN TREE 
A. Brief Retrospect of Multi-Timescale Simulation Model 
 
Fig. 1. Timescales of dynamics in cascading outages [24]. 
To represent the time elapse in simulation, ref. [24] 
categorizes events in cascading outages by timescales, as 
shown in Fig. 1. Then a quasi-dynamic simulation framework is 
utilized, which inserts the simulation of shorter timescales 
between adjacent longer-timescale events (Fig. 2). Thus 
multi-timescale simulation is realized and approximate time 
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elapse is provided, which reasonably reflects the actual 
characteristics of cascading outages. Since reasonable 
modeling and simulation of cascading outages is a prerequisite 
of practical risk assessment, next we will show how to 
reformulate the quasi-dynamic multi-timescale model as 
Markovian tree as a foundation of the novel risk assessment 
method. 
 
Fig. 2. Quasi-dynamic multi-timescale simulation framework [24]. 
B. Markovian-Tree Simulation of Cascading Outages 
1) Markovian tree modeling of mid-timescale random outages 
In the model proposed in [24] (named as “quasi-dynamic 
model” in the rest of the paper), the mid-timescale random 
outages have uncertainties, causing distinct cascading outage 
sequences. If we merge same states of all the possible cascading 
outage sequences from the beginning state, a tree structure will 
be formulated, as shown in Fig. 3. Assume cascading outages 
are Markovian [11, 25], the tree is then a Markovian tree. Each 
node on Markovian tree represents a state, and each branch on 
Markovian tree represents a mid-timescale random outage. 
Similar to the quasi-dynamic model, every mid-timescale 
transition corresponds to a time elapse D , and the reasonable 
values of D  will be discussed afterwards with test cases. 
 
Fig. 3. Markovian tree representation of cascading outage paths 
The labelling of states on a Markovian tree is determined as 
follows. The beginning state is level-0 node, and subsequent 
states are labelled sequentially as level-1 nodes, level-2 nodes, 
etc. Note that not every state transition corresponds to an outage, 
it is possible that no outage occurs during D . If we label 
elements with positive integers, then a state is coded as the 
sequence of labels of failed elements from the initial outage up 
to the current level (no-outage labelled as 0), i.e. 
1 2
( )
nk k k
i i i . 
In this paper only branch outage events are considered, but the 
modeling and simulation of generator outages are very similar. 
The costs of cascading outages come from the dispatch 
control, load shed by power balancing when system separates, 
or load shed by emergency control measures on each level of 
the Markovian tree. The selection of the definition of the cost 
also has flexibility: the cost can be the load or the energy loss at 
each level of outage, or the economic loss caused by the 
outages. In this paper, the cascading outage simulation is based 
on DC power flow, and the cost of an outage C  on Markovian 
tree is the sum of load loss from re-dispatch RC  and load loss 
from network balancing BC . Every state 1 2( )nk k ki i i  
corresponds to a non-negative cost denoted as 
1 2
( )
nk k k
C i i i .  
1 2 1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )
n n nk k k R k k k B k k k
C i i i C i i i C i i i         (1) 
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1nk
i

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1 2 1
( )
rk k k
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
) depends on its previous state 
1 2
( )
rk k k
i i i , so 
the conditional probability of event 
1nk
i

 is denoted as 
1 1 2
Pr( | )
n nk k k k
i i i i

. With these terms, take the risk assessment 
of expected load loss as example, the risk is expressed as  
1 1 1 2 1 1 2
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i i i i i i C i i i
  
 
  
  
     (2) 
Different from the quasi-dynamic model which is able to 
sample more than one outage in each interval, here similar to 
[11, 25, 26], each interval D  allows at most one element 
outage. To ensure the equivalency between the quasi-dynamic 
model and the Markovian tree model, the mid-timescale 
interval D   in the Markovian tree is set as 1/ N  of that in the 
quasi-dynamic model, thus the Markovian tree model is 
equivalent to the case of sampling up to N  outages during the 
same period. It is found through tests that generally 3 ~ 5N   
can satisfy practical needs. Moreover, the Markovian tree 
model considers the sequence of outages, which is even closer 
to system reality than the quasi-dynamic model. 
The requirement of single outages on the Markovian tree 
renders different definitions of probability. In the 
quasi-dynamic model, outage events are sampled 
independently, while in the Markovian tree model, the outage 
probability is defined as “the probability that the outage is the 
first to occur”. Assume that the occurrence of outages follow 
Poisson process, where the outage rate of element i  is i . 
Then in the quasi-dynamic model, the outages are sampled 
independently with probabilities in interval D : 
Pr 1 i DSamplei e
                               (3) 
while in the Markovian tree model, the outage probability of 
each element is 
Pr 1
j D
jMT i
i
j
j
e
 


 
  
 
 


                     (4) 
where “MT” is the abbreviation of Markovian tree. In (4) the 
outage probability of element i  is not only dependent on i , 
but also on outage rates of other elements. The probability that 
there is no outage in interval D  is 
0Pr
j D
jMT e
 


                             (5) 
2) Simulation of Re-dispatch 
Re-dispatch is categorized as a mid-timescale process. 
When overload occurs, dispatchers adjust generators or dump 
loads to relieve the overload. In conventional models [19, 20, 
22], re-dispatch is modeled as an optimization problem and the 
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optimal solution is instantly applied as the new state. 
However, re-dispatch takes time [27]: when overloading 
occurs, the system needs time to acquire data, analyze system 
conditions and reflect the data to operators; the operators also 
need time to judge and make decisions before taking actions. 
Moreover, due to the generation ramping speed constraints, it 
also takes time from the beginning of actions till the fulfillment 
of re-dispatch objectives. Therefore, the re-dispatch is a process 
with a time delay Delayt  and ramping.  
As shown in Fig. 4, when an overloading event occurs at 0t , 
the re-dispatch action for the event is not immediately started. 
During interval 0 0 Delayt t t t    , the system may be taking 
actions dealing with previous events or there is no action at all. 
Considering the time-delay nature of re-dispatch, a queue of 
re-dispatch commands is prepared in simulation. As an event 
occurs, add the corresponding command to the queue and wait 
until the action is due. The latest command meeting the 
beginning time is offered from the queue and starts executing. 
The command in action is kept until re-dispatch is finished or it 
is replaced by a new command. 
 
Fig. 4. Illustration of Re-dispatch Simulation 
3) Simulation of Short-timescale Processes 
Ref. [24] mentions that short-timescale processes mainly 
refer to outages directly triggered by protection relays and 
actions of emergency control. These processes usually finish in 
several seconds and are much shorter than processes in other 
timescales, and these processes follow strict preset logics. 
In simulation, when system states change, check whether 
short-timescale processes occur, if so then first simulates them. 
As illustrated in Fig. 5, event 
mk
i  triggers a short-timescale 
event denoted as 
1| ml k
i , and consequently triggers event 
2 | ml k
i , 
then afterwards the short-timescale process ends. Since this 
process is very short compared with the Markovian tree 
structure of mid-timescale processes, the short-timescale 
process can be modeled as an equivalent node. 
 
Fig. 5. Illustration of Short-timescale Processes in Markovian tree 
In the simulation of short-timescale processes, there may be 
load losses caused by island balancing when system separates 
or by emergency load shedding. It should be noted that since 
these losses are not caused by market-based measures, the unit 
economic cost of these losses are usually much higher than 
electricity market prices. Therefore when estimating the 
expected economic loss, the unit economic cost is E (e.g 
100[28]) times of dispatch operations. 
It should also be noted that this model can deal with more 
diverse events, such as bus outages and instability events. The 
simulation of bus outages is similar to that of short-timescale 
branch/generator outages. The instability events usually need 
time-domain simulation [24, 29], which can also be 
incorporated into this simulation model. 
4) Simulation of long-timescale processes 
A long-timescale process corresponds to the variation of 
load level. Since searching in depth on the Markovian tree also 
means elapse of time, the simulation of load variation can be 
realized by updating system loads according to the load curve. 
C. An illustrative example of Markovian tree 
To better illustrate the mechanism of cascading outage 
simulation with Markovian tree, here an example is provided. 
As Fig. 6 shows, the cascading outages start with initial 
outage(s) at time 0t  , then the initial outage(s) might trigger 
short timescale events and re-dispatch operation. Since 
short-timescale events are much faster than the re-dispatch and 
mid-timescale outages, the short-timescale events should be the 
first to be simulated. After outages and short-timescale events, 
the re-dispatch operation and mid-timescale outage in an 
interval D   are simulated. 
 
Fig. 6. An illustrative example of Markovian tree 
Because any element may fail in an interval D , so there are 
various possible directions of cascading outage development, 
corresponding to the forked structure in every interval shown in 
Fig. 6. The direction of cascading outage development is 
denoted with the index of the failed element. Note that there 
might be no outage during an interval, and in this case the path 
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is indexed as 0. So during the interval D  after any state, there 
is a forked structure of possible cascading outage directions. 
Therefore, all the possible cascading outage paths can be 
collected as a tree structure as Fig. 6 demonstrates.  
In each cascading outage simulation with Markovian tree, a 
complete cascading outage path is simulated from the initial 
outages till the terminal of the path. On the Markovian tree 
structure, the simulated path is a linked list of nodes on the tree 
starting from the root node (initial outages) to the terminal. In 
Fig. 6, the filled nodes constitute a cascading outage path. The 
path means that at around 10 minutes after initial outages, the 
element 2 fails, and at around 15 minutes the element 3 fails. 
It should be noted that due to the dependency in a cascading 
outage sequence, each post-outage state should be updated 
rather than regarding the outages as independent combinations. 
And since there are possibly re-dispatch operations, emergency 
control measures and dynamic processes after each outage, the 
outcomes of different orders of outages from the same outage 
combination are probably different, and the risks of these 
different outage sequences are probably different. So in this 
paper the outage sequences in different orders are treated as 
different and are simulated respectively. 
It is also remarkable that the proposed Markovian tree 
model maintains the merits of model [24], yet as the previous 
sections demonstrate, the realization of the two models still has 
substantial difference and the transformation from model [24] 
to the Markovian tree is not trivial work. The following sections 
will show that the efficient risk assessment method will be 
realized based on the Markovian tree structure. So the 
Markovian tree model plays as a bridge between reasonable 
simulation of cascading outages and realization of efficient risk 
assessment. 
III. ENHANCING EFFICIENCY USING TREE SEARCH 
A. The methodology of risk assessment with tree search 
Following the details proposed in Section II, simulation of 
cascading outages can be realized on the Markovian tree as 
equivalent to the model in [24], and risk assessment can be 
carried out by sampling on the Markovian tree. Yet sampling 
duplicates simulation of same cascade paths. To enhance 
efficiency, the simulated cascade paths can be recorded and 
avoided in further simulation. Thus risk assessment becomes 
searching on the Markovian tree.  
The risk (2) can be regarded as the sum of risk terms of all 
the single states on the Markovian tree. Therefore, the risk 
assessment based on the Markovian tree can be regarded as 
simulating new states on the Markovian tree and adding new 
corresponding terms onto (2). Since the terms in (2) are 
non-negative, the risk is expected to keep increasing until 
reaching a value R  which is the cascading outage risk of the 
system. 
Fig. 7 illustrates the mechanism of risk assessment with 
Markovian tree search. The nodes with bold borderline 
constitute a partial cascading outage path. The nodes with grey 
color denote states that have been simulated in previous 
searches. In current search, these states are directly retrieved 
from the memory. The nodes with white color are states that 
have not been reached. The events of these states are simulated 
based on section II, the risk terms corresponding to these states 
are added to (1), and then the states are stored in the memory. 
 
Fig. 7. Risk assessment with Markovian tree search 
The risk assessment using tree search has similarities with 
the splitting method [30, 31]. The splitting method enhances the 
efficiency of cascading outage simulation by splitting the tree 
structure of cascade events into stages, and initiating the 
sampling of a stage from the desired sampled ending states of 
the previous stage which is stored in the memory. In essence, 
the splitting method and the Markovian tree search method both 
make use of the data generated in the previous computation, 
and manage to achieve time efficiency enhancement with some 
sacrifice on memory space. In the analysis of cascading outages, 
the computation time is more critical than memory resources, 
so exploiting memory to enhance time efficiency is reasonable. 
However, the realization and the assumption of these two 
methods are different. The splitting method is still based on 
sampling the random outages, and the Markovian tree search 
method assumes that the probability of any outage can be 
obtained and the risk is directly estimated using the probability. 
In Markovian tree search method, since the risk term is 
estimated with only one simulation, so each state can be only 
simulated once. Whereas for sampling-based models, repeated 
simulations of same cascade paths is inevitable. Therefore, the 
Markovian tree search method is more efficient than the 
sampling-based models. It should be noted that the Markovian 
tree search method cannot deal with the case that the random 
outage is a black box and the probability cannot be explicitly 
obtained. The probabilistic modeling in cascading outages will 
be more extensively discussed in III.B. 
While comparing the memory usage of splitting method and 
the Markovian tree method, the splitting method saves more 
memory space than the current realization of the Markovian 
tree method, since the splitting method is able to discard the 
results of previous outage sequences and store the end states 
only. However, as the test case in Section V.B will show, the 
memory usage of the Markovian tree search method can be 
satisfied with common computation platforms. Moreover, such 
difference is on the realization level and is caused by the 
different purposes of these two methods. From the perspective 
of the event tree, the splitting method in [31] mainly focuses on 
the simulation and estimation of rare and extreme events, which 
requires to search in-depth into the event tree. So the partial 
event tree formed by splitting method can be very deep but is 
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relatively thin. Whereas in this paper, the Markovian tree 
method is proposed to estimate the overall risk of cascading 
outages, the event tree should first be wide enough to cover as 
fully as possible the lower-level events, because these events 
have higher probabilities even though the costs of these event 
are usually small, and thus the risks of these lower-level events 
cannot be omitted. And the in-depth searching to high risk 
cascading outage sequences depends on the strategy to be 
introduced in Section IV. Both of the two methods have 
potential for alternative purposes. For example, in the splitting 
method, more times of sampling can be arranged in the lower 
levels of cascading outages to adapt to the need for risk 
assessment. And the Markovian tree search can also be realized 
in segments to focus on the rarer and more extreme events. 
B. Discussion on Probabilities in Risk assessment 
The probabilities of outages are derived according to the 
model [24] that considers the time elapse of heat accumulation 
and some environmental factors. Yet it should be noted that in 
practice, estimating the probabilities of cascading outages is a 
difficult problem that has not been well solved. The difficulties 
of estimating the probability of cascading outages mainly lie in 
the following factors: 
1) There are various kinds of causes to outages in a whole 
process of cascading outages. A power system consists of many 
kinds of elements, and any element may outage during the 
process of cascading outages due to various causes [32]. A line 
may outage due to sagging (2003 US-Canada blackout), 
annealing, lightning (2009 Brazil-Paraguay blackout), 
mis-operation (2011 Arizona-California outages), improper 
protection setting (2006 UCTE disturbance), power system 
oscillation (1996 WSCC outages), ice and snow (2008 South 
China blackout), geomagnetic storm (1989 Hydro-Quebec 
blackout), etc. A generator may fail due to over-current, 
over-/under-excitation, over-/under-frequency, etc. Also there 
are other kinds of elements or components that may outage, 
such as underground cables, transformers (2005 Moscow 
blackout), HVDC, control center (2003 US-Canada blackout) 
and communication infrastructure (1988 Hydro-Quebec 
blackout), etc. The power system itself also demonstrates 
complex dynamics in multiple timescales during cascading 
outage. Therefore, the cascading outage is a process involving 
complex and dependent system behavior, and a variety of 
outages of different kinds of elements caused by system 
dynamics and/or external factors. To comprehensively study all 
kinds of events in cascading outages, it is necessary acquire 
adequate amount of data and logs in operation. However, 
currently the power systems still face lack of data, which 
hinders credible modeling and verification of possible kinds of 
element outages. 
2) The modeling of each kind of outage event is difficult 
due to various influencing factors. Currently, providing 
probabilistic model of each kind of outage mechanism is 
difficult because of (a) the difficulty in establishing the 
probabilistic model considering all the important influencing 
factors and (b) the lack of sources to collect data of those 
factors in practice. Take the outage of overhead line caused by 
sagging and tree contact as example, the IEEE Standard 738 [33] 
points out that there are various factors that influences the 
steady-state sag of overhead lines, including the current on 
conductor, the type of conductor, ambient temperature, wind 
speed, wind direction, season, the time of day, sunshine 
illumination, etc. Moreover, the outage caused by tree contact 
also depends on the height of vegetation under the overhead 
line. We can see that not only electric-side variables but also 
many environmental factors influence the line outage event, 
while till now the line outage models in the existing literatures 
[19, 24, 26, 34, 35] are intuitive but not accurate enough, and 
there is not yet credible probabilistic model of such outage 
event with comprehensive consideration of the influencing 
factors [36]. Moreover, in practice, it is difficult to monitor or 
predict all these environmental factors accurately, making the 
model hard to utilize in application.  
From above, it can be concluded that the estimation of 
outage probability requires more accurate modeling of the 
physical process of various kinds of outages, which asks for 
enhanced study of element reliability, modeling of 
environmental factors as well as verification of models with 
field tests and observations during operation. Also, 
concentration should be placed on enhancing the situational 
awareness of power systems to enable the utilization of more 
accurate models, especially for the monitoring and 
management of environmental data. 
C. Convergence criteria of risk assessment 
In the risk assessment with Markovian tree search, the 
theoretical value of risk is obtained when all the possible 
cascading outage paths are exhausted and simulated. if there are 
N  elements at the initial state, and DK  levels on the 
Markovian tree, then the number of all possible cascade paths 
on Markovian tree is 
0
! !
( )!( )! !
DK
D
T
D Di
N K
N
N K i K i i


                    (6) 
From (6) we can see that the number of possible cascade 
paths is huge for common-sized systems so that it is practically 
impossible to exhaust all the paths. Therefore, in practice we 
can only simulate a portion of the paths. In risk assessment, as 
cascade paths are simulated, the value of risk keeps growing 
and gradually approaches the theoretical value, and the total 
probability of simulated cascade paths also approaches 1. Thus 
the criteria for the convergence of risk assessment are proposed 
as satisfying the following two conditions: 
1) The value of risk is stable (e.g. the growth of risk in the 
past 5000 searches is less than 0.1% of current risk value). 
2) The total probability of simulated cascade paths exceeds 
a certain threshold (e.g. 0.97). 
Usually the distribution of risks among all possible cascade 
paths is extremely non-uniform that risk is concentrated in a 
small portion of cascading outage paths. Observing the risk (2), 
since risk assessment is to add terms onto (2), the searching for 
states with larger risk terms in priority will achieve faster 
convergence of risk. To accelerate the convergence of the risk, 
a strategy of searching should be proposed which guides 
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searching to the paths with major contribution to the risk. Next 
we will establish strategies that guide searching to such states. 
IV. TREE SEARCH STRATEGY USING RISK ESTIMATION INDEX 
A. Risk Estimation Index 
Take the partial Markovian tree in Fig. 8 to study the 
searching strategy. Assume that searching has reached “*” state 
(labelled as 
1 1
( )
rk k
i i

) and is about to select a next-level 
event 
rk
i  (hollow nodes pointed by solid line arrows) to 
simulate. The strategy should let the increment of risk of the 
selected path be as large as possible, so the first task is to 
estimate the risks of all the subsequent states with acceptable 
computation complexity. 
 
Fig. 8. Partial Markovian Tree when Search Starts 
Here a risk estimation index 
1 1
|k k kr ri i i


(simply denoted as 
kr
i since all studied subsequent states in this section have the 
same previous events 
1 1rk k
i i

) is established, and 
probabilities for searching are determined using 
kr
i . The 
index consists of the following three parts: 
1) Risk of System Separation 
If the outage of a branch causes the grid to separate, then the 
branch is called a cut branch of the grid. According to [37], cut 
branches can be identified with complexity of ( )O E , where 
E  is the number of connected branches. Denote the 
admittance matrix of the grid as Y , then its Penrose-Moore 
pseudo-inverse uniquely exists, denoted as Z  
Z Y                                        (7) 
A branch { , }
rk
i u v  is a cut branch if and only if 
1 2 0uv uv uu vvY Z Z Z
                          (8) 
Considering numerical errors, set a sufficiently small 
threshold   (e.g. 1010 ), if  
1 2uv uv uu vvY Z Z Z 
                        (9) 
then the branch is identified as a cut branch. If { , }
rk
i u v  is a 
cut branch and it fails, the separated two parts of the system will 
have unbalanced power uvF , which needs power balancing 
and generates cost. Therefore, the cost of system separation 
caused by cut branch 
rk
i  outage is estimated as 
1
1
2 , 2
, { , }
0, 2
k rr
uv uv uv uu vv
i k
uv uv uu vv
F Y Z Z Z
i u v
Y Z Z Z






    

 
   

   (10) 
And the risk of system separation is estimated as 
1
Pr( )
k r kr r
i k k ii i
                            (11) 
2) Risk of Overloading 
After the outage of non-cut branches, the power flow will 
re-distribute throughout the system and may cause overloading 
on other elements, leading to costs generated by re-dispatch or 
emergency control actions. The influence of a branch outage on 
other branches can be quantified by the power transfer 
distribution factor (PTDF). The PTDF of a non-cut branch 
{ , }u v  to any other branch { , }p q  [37] is  
1 ( 2 )
up vq uq vppq
uv pq
uv uu vv uv
Z Z Z Z
Y
Y Z Z Z

  
 
  
                (12) 
The power flow on { , }p q  after the outage of{ , }u v  is 
*uv pq
pq pq uv uvF F F                              (13) 
And the extent of overloading on branch { , }p q  is 
* * maxmax{ ,0}uv uvpq pq pqF F                        (14) 
Define the overloading index of branch{ , }u v  outage as 
*
{ , }
, { , }
rkr
uv
pq ki
p q E
i u v 

                       (15) 
and define the estimation of overloading risk as 
1
Pr( )
rk kr r
k ki i
i i                             (16) 
Observing the denominator of (9), if { , }u v  is a cut branch, 
then the denominator is 0. So the PTDF of a cut branch has no 
definition. Therefore if (9) is satisfied, then 0
kr
i
  . 
For any studied state, about 
2
E  PTDF values and 
post-outage flows on branches are needed to calculate, so the 
estimation of overloading risk has the complexity of 
2
( )O E . 
3) Secondary Risk 
Considering Fig. 8, when selecting the next-level states of 
“*” state, the risk of subsequent states of next-level states 
should also be accounted for. This risk is called a secondary 
risk in this paper. Since the secondary risk is hard to 
analytically quantify, a rough estimation is given in this paper. 
First calculate the power flow *uvpqF  of all the connected 
lines { , }p q  after outage of branch { , }
rk
i u v , and calculate 
the corresponding probabilities of outage *Pr uvpq  during the next 
interval using (4)-(5). According to the overloading extent of 
*uv
pqF , give an estimation of the cost 
*uv
pqC  (it is difficult to 
accurately analyze, so in this paper *uvpqC is set as 1% of system 
load), then the secondary risk of { , }
rk
i u v  is 
 1 1
* *Pr( ) Pr /
r k kk rr
uv uv
k k pq pq i ii
i i C E             (17) 
where 
1k kr
i iE  is the set of connected branches at state 
1
( )
rk k
i i , and 
1k kr
i iE  is the number of connected branches.  
If a next-level state has no outage, i.e. 0
rk
i  , then system 
separation risk and overloading risk are both considered as 0, 
but the secondary risk may be non-zero. In this case, if 
approximately regarding the system state at 0
rk
i   the same as 
that of 
1rk
i

, then the secondary events can be seen as shifting 
the next-level events of 
1rk
i

 to 
rk
i . If the probability of 0
rk
i   
is 0Pr , then the corresponding secondary risk can be defined as 
1 1
0
0
Pr
kr
kk k rr
i
ii iE
  

                        (18) 
where 1   is a discount factor considering that risk will be 
reduced by control schemes in the system. 
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For a studied state, the complete estimation of secondary 
risks needs about 
2
E times of *Pr uvpq  and  
*uv
pqC  calculation, so 
the complexity of secondary risk estimation is 
2
( )O E . 
4) Establishing the risk estimation index 
Till now, at arbitrary newly-searched state 
1 1
( )
rk k
i i

, the 
risk estimation index of next-level branch { , }
rk
i u v  outage is 
k k k kr r r r
i i i i
                              (19) 
where , ,    are weights of risk terms. In this paper we select 
1     . The risk estimation index of 0
rk
i   is  
0 0
                                      (20) 
The above derivation of risk estimation index in this paper 
only considers branch outages, while the methodology of 
establishing risk estimation index can be used for the risk 
estimation of other kinds of events. Since in power flow model, 
the system state after bus/generator outage can be similarly 
derived using distribution factor, so the risk estimation index of 
bus and generator outages can be similarly established. 
However, the instability events have significantly different 
mechanism from the derivations above, therefore the severity 
estimation of instability events may be different from the above 
analysis. To limit computational complexity of risk estimation, 
stability indices [38-42] can be utilized to estimate the severity 
[43, 44] of instability event. 
The overall complexity of risk estimation index is 
2
( )O E , 
while in the simulation of each level of cascading outages, the 
update of matrices is 
2 3
( ) ~ ( )O V O V , and the complexity of 
re-dispatch is bounded by 
3.5
( )O E . Therefore, the complexity 
of risk estimation index is much lower than the simulation, so 
the calculation of risk estimation index does not notably affect 
the overall efficiency. 
B. Forward-Backward Scheme of Markovian Tree Search 
1) Forward searching using risk estimation index 
As shown in Fig. 8, if a new state (labeled with asterisk) is 
reached on the Markovian tree, then all the subsequent states 
and paths are new. The risk estimation indices of next-level 
states are calculated and probabilities for selecting these states 
can be obtained using risk estimation indices. If the index is 
thought as accurate reflection of risks, then the optimal search 
strategy is to guide to the path with the highest risk estimation 
index value, which is a deterministic strategy 
1, arg max{ }
Pr
0,
r
kr
k i
calc i
i
i
otherwise

 

                    (21) 
However, the risk estimation index may have error, so it is 
essential to have randomness in searching. Another strategy is 
random search with equal probability 
 
1 1
Pr 1/ 1
k k kr r
calc
i i iE

                        (22) 
The searching strategies of (21) and (22) represent two 
extremes: deterministic search vs. pure random search. To keep 
the merits of both approaches, the strategy can be selected in 
between. Introduce a parameter 0   and set probability 
 
 
1 1
{0}
Pr
kr
kr
i ik kr
i
calc
i
E










                     (23) 
For 0  , equation (23) is equivalent to (22), and for 
  , equation (23) is approximately (21). 
During the simulation of cascading outages, the matrices 
Y , Z  need to be updated. If a set of branches { }ki  are removed 
from the grid, then the admittance matrix can be updated with 
{ } { } { }( )k k k
T
i i iY Y M Diag y M                     (24) 
where { }kiM  is a { }kV i  matrix. Each of its column 
ki
M corresponding to a branch { , }ki u v  satisfies , 1ki uM  , 
, 1ki vM    and all other entries are 0. { }( )kiDiag y is a matrix 
with branch admittances of { }ki ’s as its diagonal elements. The 
update of matrix Y  (24) can be finished with a very small 
amount of calculation, with complexity of ({ } )kO i . The 
update of Z  is realized with 
1
{ } { } { }k k k
T
i i iZ Z ZM z M Z
                      (25) 
where  
1
{ } { } { } { }( )k k k k
T
i i i iz Diag y M ZM
               (26) 
Since outages usually occur to very few branches at a time, 
{ }ki
z  is small and (25) has complexity of 
2
( )O V . However the 
inverse of (26) requires that { }ki  is not a cut set. If { }ki  is a cut 
set, then the update of Z  has to be realized with SVD of Y , 
which has complexity of 
3
( )O V [37]. Theoretically, the SVD 
is computationally expensive, and an alternative that searches 
islands and simulate events on each island respectively 
consumes less computational resources. However, tests on 
RTS-96 system show that the instances requiring SVD only 
accounts for less than 20% of the matrix update computations, 
so the influence of SVD on overall efficiency is not very 
significant. Moreover, the actual efficiency may depend on 
realization. Take the realization on MATLAB as example, the 
SVD is a mature and efficient built-in function and supports 
further enhancement such as GPU acceleration, so the matrix 
with SVD update is also a practical and convenient option. 
2) Backward updating risk estimation indices 
 
Fig. 9. Backward Update of risk estimation indices on Markovian tree 
After states on cascading outage paths are visited and 
recorded, reaching these states again in the future will not 
contribute to the increment of the risk. Therefore, after a 
cascading outage path is found, the risk estimation indices 
should also be updated. On the contrary to the searching 
direction from the root to terminals of the Markovian tree, the 
updating of risk estimation indices should go backwards from 
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terminals to the root. As shown in Fig. 9, assume that solid 
nodes are visited states and the node labelled as 3 in the bottom 
is the terminal of the path. Since searching to a visited terminal 
again will not make any contribution to the risk, then for a 
terminal state 
nk
i  on a cascading outage path 
1 2 nk k k
i i i , assign 
its risk estimation index a sufficiently small value 
kn
i R   to 
avoid visiting it again. 
For a non-terminal state 
rk
i , since it has been visited and the 
risk term on the state 
rk
i  itself will not contribute to the risk 
again, then its risk estimation index will only reflect risks of its 
subsequent states. Since risk estimation indices of all its 
next-level states 
1 1 2
|k k k kr ri i i i


 must have been calculated or 
even updated, and the probabilities for searching are 
1
Pr
kr
calc
i

 according to (23), then the risk estimation index of rki is  
1 1 2 1
| Prk k k k k kr r r r
kr
calc
i i i i i i
i
 
 
 

                     (27) 
Equation (27) represents recursive backward updating of 
risk estimation indices. In the risk assessment on Markovian 
tree, first do forward search along a path, and then reversely 
update risk estimation indices using (27). 
C. Procedures of risk assessment with Markovian tree search 
 
Fig. 10. Flowchart of risk assessment 
Fig. 10 demonstrates the procedures of the proposed risk 
assessment method. To realize non-duplicated system state 
search, a search result table ST  is established to index and store 
the states that have been searched. During risk assessment, if a 
state to be simulated is found in ST , then the state is directly 
retrieved and the simulation of this level of events is avoided. If 
the state is not found in ST , then this level of outage is 
simulated according to Section II. 
V. CASE STUDIES 
A. Illustrative 4-Node System 
First verify the accuracy of the method in this paper with a 
small scale 4-node system. The system has 5 branches, 2 
generator nodes and 2 load nodes, as shown in Fig. 11. 
1) Verification of Risk Assessment Performance 
Set outage of branch 2-3 as the initial failure, and use the 
proposed method to assess the post-failure risk of the system. 
Set max 60minT   and 15minD  , then the number of 
intervals is max / 4D DK T     , where     is “ceil” 
operation. With 4N   and 4DK   we can get 73TN   
according to (6), which is not a big number and we can 
calculate the theoretical value of the risk through the 
enumeration of all possible cascade paths as 0.14208MWR  . 
 
Fig. 11. Structure of 4-Node System 
 
Fig. 12. Variation of Risk (λ=5) 
 
Fig. 13. Variation of Risk (λ=0.01) 
Then use the method proposed in this paper. Set 5   and 
0.01   respectively, and search on the Markovian tree for up 
to 100 paths, the variation of the risk as searching continues are 
shown in Figs. 12 and 13 separately. A search attempt means 
the search and simulation of an entire cascading outage path. In 
both cases, the risk reaches theoretical value 0.14208MWR  , 
but the speeds of the risk convergence are distinct. The case 
with larger   achieves a faster convergence profile. In the case 
with 5  , the convergence of the risk only takes 35 search 
attempts, while the case of 0.01   takes 87 attempts.  
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Fig. 14. Relationship between Required Attempts to Convergence and λ 
Fig. 14 demonstrates the average search attempts to 
convergence under different values of  . In this case, risk 
assessment is repeated 50 times under each   value. It is 
shown that with the increase of  , the required number of 
search attempts decreases and finally stays at 35 times. To 
further assess the convergence of the risk with SN  search 
attempts, construct the following convergence metric  
1
( )
S
S S
N
N N j
j
j R R

                          (28) 
where jR  is the risk after j th search attempt and SNR  is the 
converging risk after SN search attempts. A smaller 
SN
 metric means a better convergence profile. 
 
TABLE I. CONVERGENCE METRIC UNDER DIFFERENT TRUST FACTORS 
λ 
Average Search 
Attempts 
Average value of 
φNs 
Standard 
deviation of φNs 
0.01 101.4 145.98 59.34 
0.05 62 53.76 16.80 
0.1 50.6 29.33 7.647 
0.5 37.6 10.58 2.261 
1 35 8.144 1.276 
5 35 6.176 0.315 
10 35 5.994 0.214 
500 35 6.045 0.235 
2000 35 5.834 0.145 
10000 35 5.871 0.256 
Table I and Fig. 15 demonstrate convergence metrics under 
different values of  . It shows that a larger   gets a smaller 
SN
  so as to achieve a better convergence profile. Moreover, 
by rearranging the sequence of all cascade paths, a theoretically 
optimal sequence with minimum 
SN
 can be obtained for 
evaluating convergence of the risk assessment. In this case the 
theoretically minimum is 
* 3.01Ns  . Compared with the 
SN
 under a nearly random search ( 0.01  ), the 
SN
 of 
search in which risk estimation index plays more important role 
under 1  is much closer to 
*
Ns , and the deviation of SN is 
much smaller, which means more stable performance. 
 
Fig. 15. Convergence metric under values of different λ 
Analyzing the mechanism of Markovian tree search, a 
larger   tends to select cascading outage paths with higher risk 
estimation indices. The effectiveness of the proposed tree 
search scheme also verifies that the risk estimation indices can 
well reflect the distribution of actual risks. Since risk estimation 
index has a low computation complexity, the practicality of risk 
estimation index is verified. 
However, the selection of   is not simply “the larger the 
better” since a too large   annihilates the randomness in path 
selection, and thus might miss some “hidden” risky states. 
Moreover, a too large   may cause overflow of floating point 
numbers in (23). Therefore in this case selecting   within 
1~100 is suggested. 
2) Influence of Mid-timescale Interval Length 
The mid-timescale interval length D   is an important 
parameter in Markovian tree search. The determination of D  
was discussed in [24], but since there are some difference 
between [24] and this paper in detail, the influence of D  
should also be studied. Assign D  from 3min to 20min, and do 
risk assessment respectively. 
  
Fig. 16. Influence of different τD on risk assessment results. 
From Fig. 16, although the value of D  are quite different, 
the assessed risks are fairly close, showing insensitivity of 
results to the D , which is reasonable since D  is a simulation 
parameter. As D  increases, risk slightly decreases because a 
larger D  allows fewer outages in the same period of time, so 
that some cases of multiple outages cannot be covered and the 
assessed risk is lower. But from the results in Fig. 16, the 
contribution of successive multiple outages to risk is rather 
limited since the probability of such a case is usually small. So 
a larger D  can satisfy the requirement of accuracy and has the 
advantage of better efficiency. If accuracy is preferred, then a 
smaller D  is desirable, while if efficiency is the priority, a 
larger D  is more suitable with satisfactory accuracy. 
3) The Impact of Re-dispatch Delay 
This risk assessment method can be utilized to study the 
impact of some system parameter on the cascading outage risk, 
and gives a clue on how to lower the risk. 
 
Fig. 17. The impact of re-dispatch delay on risk 
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The operation delay is an important performance factor 
related to system security but is seldom studied in existing 
research on cascading outages. Here, we change Delayt  to 
study the impact of delay on risk as shown in Fig. 17. It is 
shown that the risk rises as Delayt  increases, and the impact of 
delay is more significant when Delayt is small. Because the 
re-dispatch is usually activated in 5-10 minutes [27] after 
events, the risk can be more effectively reduced if delay is 
shortened. In practice the decrease in delay usually requires a 
control system upgrade, and the results in Fig. 17 can be helpful 
in the cost/effect analysis for system upgrade. 
B. RTS-96 Test System 
1) Performance of risk estimation index 
In this part the method is tested on a larger RTS-96 3-area 
system [12] having 73 buses, 120 branches, 33 generator nodes 
and 51 load nodes. Select outages of branches 22, 23 and 24 as 
initial outages and assess risk. In this case, set 15minD  , 
max 150minT  , delay of re-dispatch 30 minDelayt  . 
First we test the accuracy of the proposed risk estimation 
index in estimating the risk of subsequent cascading outage 
paths. Since the risk estimation index is proposed to facilitate 
the selection of next-level cascading outage path, we mainly 
compare the risk estimation indices of the states having the 
same previous state. For example, we study the risk estimation 
indices and the subsequent risk of the states on level 1. The 
subsequent risk of level-1 state 
1k
i  is  
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
2
1 2 1 3 1 2 1 2 3
2 3
( ) Pr( ) ( ) Pr( ) Pr( | ) ( )
Pr( ) Pr( | ) Pr( | ) ( )
k k k k k k k k
k
k k k k k k k k k
k k
R i i C i i i i C i i
i i i i i i C i i i
 
 

 
 (29) 
 
Fig. 18. Correlation between risk and risk estimation index 
Fig. 18 shows the relationship between subsequent risk of 
level-1 state 
1
( )kR i  and risk estimation index 
1k
i  in a log-log 
plot. The plot contains 118 scattered data points. The results 
visually demonstrate positive relationship between 
1
( )kR i  and 
1k
i . Linear regression of these points show the approximated 
quantified relationship as 
11
10 10log 0.6063 log ( ) 1.2964ki kR i     
and the Pearson’s correlation coefficient is 0.712, indicating 
strong linear positive correlation between 
1
( )kR i  and 
1k
i . The 
risks and risk estimation indices on other levels of Markovian 
tree generally show similar strong positive correlation, which 
verifies that the risk estimation index can effectively guide the 
tree search to cascading outage paths with higher risks. 
2) Efficiency test of risk assessment 
According to (6), the number of possible cascading paths is 
about 
203.5491 10 , so it is unrealistic to enumerate them all 
and calculate theoretical risk value. Here use a relatively large 
number of search attempts SN  and regard the risk at SN  
attempts NsR  as the theoretical risk R . The test program is 
developed and tested in MATLAB on a workstation with 2.6 
GHz processor and 32GB RAM. 
Set 300000SN   and get risk 252.76MWNsR   through 
risk assessment. From Fig. 19, the risk rises sharply at the 
beginning and approaches NsR quickly in the first several 
thousands of search attempts, and then its rising speed becomes 
much slower. As Table II shows, after 19 search attempts the 
risk has reached 0.5 NsR , and then after 2709 attempts the index 
reaches 0.9 NsR , with computation time less than 10 min. But 
reaching 0.99 NsR takes a much larger amount of computation, 
consuming several hours. From the perspective of application, 
it is of practically required to apply risk assessment with limited 
computation time. In this case, no more than 5000 attempts and 
1000 seconds of computation time can account for more than 
90% of the cascading risk. 
Fig. 20 shows the covered probability of simulated cascade 
paths along the process of risk assessment. At the beginning, 
the coverage of probability rises sharply over 0.9, and after the 
first 2000 search attempts nearly 0.97 has been covered. 
Therefore, most probable cascade paths have been simulated 
and assessed, and since the risk estimation index can effectively 
guide computation to cascade paths with major risks, the rest of 
the paths are expected to have minor contribution to the risk.  
 
Fig. 19. Risk on RTS-96 test system 
 
Fig. 20. Coverage of probability in risk assessment 
TABLE II. EFFICIENCY TEST OF RTS-96 SYSTEM 
>=RNs% 50% 90% 95% 99% 99.9% 
Search Attempts 19 2709 6259 129134 259856 
Time (s) 3.87 552 1277 26360 53044 
Prob. Coverage 0.961 0.969 0.973 0.991 0.992 
With a high-performance computer and software-level 
optimization, the computation efficiency of this method is 
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expected to meet the need for online applications. Moreover, 
using risk assessment results, all the simulated cascading 
outage paths and risks can be analyzed and measures for 
lowering risk can be established [45], which constitutes our 
future work. 
As for the memory usage, in this case where 300000 
cascading outages are simulated, about 1.8 million states are 
stored in the memory, and each state variable occupies 
672bytes, so the total memory usage for recording states is 
about 1GB, which is easily satisfied on ordinary PCs. For larger 
systems, the requirement for memory space can also be 
satisfied on workstations, servers or other high-performance 
platforms. Therefore, even though the memory usage of the 
Markovian tree search method is higher than some existing 
methods, the requirement for memory space is generally 
affordable for practical use. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, a risk assessment method of multi-timescale 
cascading outages based on Markovian tree search is proposed. 
The method first equivalently reformulates our previous work 
of quasi-dynamic cascading outage simulation as a Markovian 
tree model, thus the method maintains the advantage of 
reasonable modeling and simulation for multi-timescale 
cascading outages. The Markovian tree model bridges the 
reasonable modeling and simulation with the efficient risk 
assessment. Then the methodology of risk assessment by 
non-duplicated cascading outage path searching on Markovian 
tree is proposed, which enhances efficiency by avoiding 
duplicated searches on cascade paths and effectively exploiting 
computation resources. 
To accelerate the convergence of the risk, this paper 
proposed a risk estimation index that estimates the risks of 
next-level cascading outage paths with low computational 
efficiency, and a “forward search – backward update” scheme 
for risk assessment based on the risk estimation index is 
established. The strategy can effectively and efficiently guide 
the search to paths with major contributions to the risk, further 
enhancing efficiency of risk assessment. 
The method is first tested on an illustrative 4-bus system to 
verify the accuracy and effectiveness of risk assessment by a 
comparison with theoretical results. The selection of search 
strategy is also tested and analyzed from the perspective of the 
balancing between the deterministic selection of the largest risk 
estimation index and random searching, and the effectiveness 
of risk estimation index is verified. The risk assessment method 
is also tested on the RTS-96 system, showing that the method is 
able to effectively search out riskiest cascade paths and states 
accounting for more than 90% risk in less than 10 minutes, 
indicating that the computation speed has potential to meet the 
requirements for operational risk assessment.  
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